Culture wars, perception gap and affective polarizationan approach from the spanish case

  1. Rojo Martínez, José Miguel
  2. Crespo Martínez, Ismael
  3. Mora Rodríguez, Alberto
Revista:
OBETS: Revista de Ciencias Sociales

ISSN: 1989-1385

Año de publicación: 2023

Volumen: 18

Número: 1

Páginas: 79-96

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.14198/OBETS.21976 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: OBETS: Revista de Ciencias Sociales

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

Previous research has shown the existence of strong relationships between affective polarization and culture wars, but it is unknown to what extent this emotional division is, in fact, a ‘false polarization’ generated from second-order beliefs in those identity issues that categorize and define group membership. Using data from the ‘First National Survey of Political Polarization’ in Spain, an operationalization of the concept of ‘perception gap’ is proposed and an individual measurement of it through a formula that adapts the coefficient of Average Deviation (Dx̄), defined as the arithmetic mean of the absolute values of the deviations from the mean. This seeks to describe the ‘perception gap’ in Spain around two relevant culture wars in the discursive articulation of the ideological blocs: gender violence and national symbols. In the same way, the relationship between the partisan affiliation of the voters and the levels of perceptive gap is analyzed. In this regard, it is shown that, in those matters that are claimed as a symbolic property of an ideological bloc, the supporters of this bloc have a higher level of ‘perception gap’, that is, they tend to exaggerate their differences with the outgroup distorting the real positions of the adversaries. When the thematic battle redirects to a position of moral superiority of the group and becomes a key issue for intergroup differentiation, the homogeneity of the positions of its members is more accentuated and a greater perceptual deviation bias is also produced.

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