Culture wars, perception gap and affective polarizationan approach from the spanish case

  1. Rojo Martínez, José Miguel
  2. Crespo Martínez, Ismael
  3. Mora Rodríguez, Alberto
Revista:
OBETS: Revista de Ciencias Sociales

ISSN: 1989-1385

Año de publicación: 2023

Volumen: 18

Número: 1

Páginas: 79-96

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.14198/OBETS.21976 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: OBETS: Revista de Ciencias Sociales

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

Investigaciones previas han mostrado la existencia de fuertes relaciones entre polarización afectiva y batallas culturales, pero se desconoce hasta qué punto esta división emocional es, de hecho, una “falsa polarización” generada a partir de creencias de segundo orden en aquellas cuestiones identitarias que categorizan y definen al grupo. Utilizando datos de la “Primera Encuesta Nacional de Polarización Política” en España, se propone una operacionalización del concepto de “brecha perceptiva” y una medición individual del mismo a través de una fórmula que adapta el coeficiente de Desviación Media (Dx̄), definida como la media aritmética de los valores absolutos de las desviaciones de la media. La fórmula pretende describir la brecha de percepción en torno a dos batallas culturales relevantes en la articulación discursiva de los bloques ideológicos: la violencia de género y los símbolos patrios. Del mismo modo, se analiza la relación entre la afiliación partidista de los votantes y los niveles de brecha perceptiva. Al respecto, se muestra que, en aquellos asuntos que se reivindican como propiedad simbólica de un bloque ideológico, los partidarios de este bloque tienen un mayor nivel de “brecha perceptiva”, es decir, tienden a exagerar sus diferencias con los demás, distorsionando las posiciones reales de los adversarios. Cuando la batalla temática se redirige a una posición de superioridad moral del grupo y se convierte en un tema clave para la diferenciación intergrupal, se acentúa más la homogeneidad de las posiciones de sus miembros y se produce también un mayor sesgo de desviación perceptiva.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet