“Enseñar la legitimación racional y la responsabilidadUn ejercicio socrático

  1. DAVID GODDEN 1
  2. JOSÉ ÁNGEL GASCÓN 2
  1. 1 Departamento de Filosofía Universidad de Estatal de Michigan
  2. 2 Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
Journal:
Revista iberoamericana de argumentación

ISSN: 2172-8801

Year of publication: 2017

Issue: 14

Pages: 75-105

Type: Article

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Revista iberoamericana de argumentación

Abstract

The paper reports on a Socratic exercise that introduces participants to the norm of rational entitlement, as distinct from political entitlement, and the attendant norm of rational responsibility. The exercise demonstrates that, because participants are not willing to exchange their own opinion at random for another differing opinion to which the owner is, by the participants’ own admission, entitled, they treat their entitlement to their own opinion differently, giving it a special status. This gives rise to rational obligations such as the obligation to provide reasons, and a willingness to risk those opinions to the force of the better reason.

Bibliographic References

  • Clifford, W. (1877). The ethics of belief. Contemporary Review, 29, 289-309. Reimpreso en: Stephen, L. y Pollock, F. (Eds.). (1886). William K. Clifford, lectures and essays. London: Macmillan and Co.
  • Engel, P. (2000). Introduction: The varieties of belief and acceptance. En P. Engel (Ed.), Believing and accepting (pp. 1-30). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  • Goodwin, J. (2002). One question, two answers. En H.V. Hansen et al. (Eds.), Argument and its applications: Proceedings of OSSA 2001, CD-ROM (pp. 1-17). Windsor, ON: OSSA.
  • Goodwin, J. (2007). Argument has no function. Informal Logic, 27, 69-90.
  • Heródoto. (1986). Historia (Libros III-IV.). Madrid: Gredos.
  • Hume, D. (2005). Investigación sobre el conocimiento humano. Madrid: Alianza.
  • Locke, J. (1999). Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
  • Pinto, R. (2006). Evaluating inferences: The nature and role of warrants. Informal Logic, 26, 287-318.
  • Siegel, H. (1997). Rationality redeemed: Further dialogues on an educational ideal. New York: Routledge.
  • Stokes, P. (2012). No, you’re not entitled to your opinion. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/no-youre-not-entitled-to-your-opinion-9978
Data source: Dialnet