Vínculos entre corrupción, transparencia y finanzas públicas en los gobiernos locales españoles

Abstract

In the first decade of the 21st century Spain registered a significant increase in political corruption, mainly at the local level and related to urban development. These corruption scandals have generated a growing concern for strengthening transparency and accountability. This PhD thesis focuses on research that explores the relationship between taxation, transparency and public finance in Spanish municipalities, with the aim of helping policymakers develop effective solutions to ensure the efficiency and sustainability of local governments. It may also be useful for legislators, civil servants and citizens interested in the subject. We analyze whether the level of transparency, measured through Dyntra's Dynamic Transparency Index, influences the collection of municipal tax revenues, considering the different taxes that municipalities can manage autonomously. The results obtained from the two-stage ordinary least squares and least squares regression analysis reveal that the most transparent municipalities manage to collect higher tax revenues, highlighting the Tax on the Increase in the Value of Urban Land (IIVNTU) and the Real Estate Tax (IBI). It is observed that a greater financing of the municipality through transfers from other levels of government has a negative impact on the collection of the Tax on Construction, Installations and Works (ICIO) and IIVNTU. It also addresses the analysis of the impact of political corruption on local government tax revenues. Since there are no specific corruption indicators for Spanish municipalities, a database on corrupt practices at the municipal level has been developed based on information from digital media. Applying the Generalized Method of Moments, it is concluded that in municipalities with higher corruption there is an increase in ICIO collection. In addition, local governments whose citizens have higher income levels collect more through direct taxes, perhaps because they consider that this increase will have less impact on citizens with more resources and, therefore, they will receive less criticism of their management. Given that corruption and lack of transparency can affect public finances and contribute to the fiscal deficit, we study the causal relationship between the deficit and several factors, such as gross domestic product, unemployment and the political sign of the ruling party. It is shown by applying quantile regression and the group-means estimator that economic growth only has a positive long-run effect on the deficit for the set of municipalities, reducing the deficit at all quantile levels except the first decile. Unemployment increases the deficit in both the short and long term and differences are observed according to the population size of the municipalities. Political participation and right-wing political parties contribute to the growth of the deficit in the upper quantiles. Finally, using different non-parametric techniques (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA-boostraping, Free Disposal Hull, partial frontiers of order-α and order-m), we determine whether transparency (given by the Dyntra Index and its sub-indicators) together with the deficit and other variables, influence the efficiency of public service provision. Our findings suggest that transparency influences efficiency, although it sometimes depends on the specific transparency indicator and the methodology used. The greater the economic and financial transparency, as well as information on contracts for public services, urban planning and public works, the more efficient the municipality is.