Activismo accionarial y retribución directiva: la influencia del say-on-payen las empresas cotizadas españolas

  1. Gregorio Sánchez Marín 2
  2. Juan Samuel Baixauli Sole 1
  3. Lozano Reina, Gabriel
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia
    info

    Universidad de Murcia

    Murcia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03p3aeb86

  2. 2 Universidad de Alcalá
    info

    Universidad de Alcalá

    Alcalá de Henares, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04pmn0e78

Revue:
Revista de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. CEF

ISSN: 2792-8314,  2792-8322

Année de publication: 2023

Número: 472

Pages: 217-244

Type: Article

DOI: 10.51302/RTSS.2023.3359 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccès ouvert editor

D'autres publications dans: Revista de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. CEF

Résumé

El say-on-pay (SOP) es una votación realizada en junta general que permite al accionariado pronunciarse –mediante un voto a favor, en contra o una abstención– acerca de la idoneidad de la retribución directiva. Esta votación, implementada originariamente por el Reino Unido en 2002, ha sido acogida en multitud de países, adoptando diversas tipologías. A pesar de las evidencias existentes hasta la fecha, sigue existiendo cierta controversia sobre su efectividad, siendo el contexto español de especial interés por sus especificidades de gobierno corporativo. En este sentido, el objetivo de este trabajo es explorar los efectos del SOP sobre el diseño de la retribución de los CEO de las empresas cotizadas españolas durante el periodo 2013-2020, analizando el grado de activismo existente, así como los efectos de la votación sobre el diseño de los paquetes retributivos. Los resultados indican que el SOP estimula la participación del accionariado en los asuntos de gobierno corporativo relacionados con la retribución, además de fomentar diseños retributivos para los CEO más alineados con los resultados empresariales.

Références bibliographiques

  • Alissa, W. (2015). Boards' response to shareholders' dissatisfaction: The case of shareholders' say on pay in the UK. European Accounting Review, 24(4), 727-752. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2015.1058719
  • Armstrong, C. S., Gow, I. D. y Larcker, D. F. (2013). The efficacy of shareholder voting: Evidence from equity compensation plans. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(5), 909-950. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12023
  • Bainbridge, S. M. (2009). Is "say on pay" justified? Regulation, 32(1), 42-47.
  • Baixauli Soler, J. S., Lozano Reina, G. y Sánchez Marín, G. (2021). Managerial discretion, say on pay, and CEO compensation. Management Decision, 59(6), 1.333-1.362. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-03-2020-0242
  • Baixauli Soler, J. S. y Sánchez Marín, G. (2011). Organizational governance and TMT pay level adjustment. Journal of Business Research, 64(8), 862-870. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. jbusres.2010.09.011
  • Baixauli Soler, J. S. y Sánchez Marín, G. (2015). Executive compensation and corporate governance in Spanish listed firms: A principalprincipal perspective. Review of Managerial Science, 9(1), 115-140. https://doi.org/10. 1007/s11846-014-0122-z
  • Balsam, S., Boone, J., Liu, H. y Yin, J. (2016). The impact of say-on-pay on executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 35(2), 162-191. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2015.11.004
  • Bebchuk, L. A. y Fried, J. M. (2004). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Harvard University Press.
  • Brunarski, K. R., Campbell, T. C. y Harman, Y. S. (2015). Evidence on the outcome of sayon-pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 132-149. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.007
  • Cai, J. y Walkling, R. A. (2011). Shareholders' say on pay: Does it create value? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(2), 299-339. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00221 09010000803
  • CNMV. (2006). Código unificado de buen gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas. https:// www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/ CodigoGov/Codigo_unificado_Esp_04.pdf
  • CNMV. (2015). Código de buen gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas. http://www.cnmv. es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/CodigoGov/ Codigo_buen_gobierno.pdf
  • Conyon, M. y Sadler, G. (2010). Shareholder voting and Directors' Remuneration Report legislation: Say on pay in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(4), 296-312. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-86 83.2010.00802.x
  • Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W. y Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0 304-405X(98)00058-0
  • Correa, R. y Lel, U. (2016). Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(3), 500-520. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.003
  • Dalton, D. R. y Dalton, C. M. (2011). Integration of micro and macro studies in governance research: CEO duality, board composition, and financial performance. Journal of Management, 37(2), 404-411.
  • De Andrés, P., Azofra, V. y López, F. (2005). Corporate boards in OECD countries: Size, composition, functioning and effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 197-210. https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00418.x
  • Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F. y Oesch, D. (2013). Shareholder votes and proxy advisors: Evidence from say on pay. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(5), 951-996. https://doi.org/10.1111/14 75-679X.12024
  • Ferri, F. y Maber, D. A. (2013). Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. Review of Finance, 17(2), 527-563. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs003
  • Franks, J. y Mayer, C. (1992). Corporate control: A synthesis of the international evidence. IFA Working Paper.
  • Gregory-Smith, I., Thompson, S. y Wright, P. W. (2014). CEO pay and voting dissent before and after the crisis. Economic Journal, 124(574). https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12108
  • Jensen, M. C. y Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
  • Jensen, M. C. y Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264. https://doi.org/10.1086/261677
  • Johnson, S., La Porta, R., López de Silanes, F. y Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. American Economic Review, 90(2), 22-27. https:// doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.22
  • Kimbro, M. B. y Xu, D. (2016). Shareholders have a say in executive compensation: Evidence from say-on-pay in the United States. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 35(1), 19-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacc pubpol.2015.08.003
  • La Porta, R., López de Silanes, F. y Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115
  • Levit, D. y Malenko, N. (2011). Nonbinding voting for shareholder proposals. Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1.579-1.614. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01682.x
  • Lozano Reina, G. y Sánchez Marín, G. (2020). Say on pay and executive compensation: A systematic review and suggestions for developing the field. Human Resource Management Review, 30(2), 100683. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.hrmr.2019.01.004
  • Lozano Reina, G., Sánchez Marín, G. y Baixauli Soler, J. S. (2019). Influence of say-on-pay as a corporate governance mechanism in Spanish listed firms. UCJC Business and Society Review, 16(4), 68-131. https://jour nals.ucjc.edu/ubr/article/view/4129
  • Mangen, C. y Magnan, M. (2012). Say on pay: A wolf in sheep's clothing? Academy of Management Perspectives, 26(2), 86-104. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2010.0098
  • Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D. y Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 43(3), 655-720. http://www.jstor. org/stable/4129473
  • Murphy, K. J. (2013). Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we got there. En G. Constantinides, M. Harris y R. Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the economics of finance (2.ª ed.). Elsevier Science North Holland.
  • Obermann, J. y Velte, P. (2018). Determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-onpay votes: A literature review and research agenda. Journal of Accounting Literature, 40, 116-151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.acclit.20 18.02.001
  • Ooghe, H. y De Langhe, T. (2002). The AngloAmerican versus the Continental European corporate governance model: Empirical evidence of board composition in Belgium. European Business Review, 14(6), 437-449. https://doi.org/10.1108/095553402104 48794
  • Ortín, A. (25 de marzo de 2022). BBVA recibe un rechazo histórico de sus accionistas a la remuneración del Consejo. OK Diario. https://okdiario.com/economia/bbva-reciberechazo-historico-sus-accionistas-remune racion-del-consejo-8795444
  • Sánchez Marín, G., Baixauli Soler, J. S. y Lucas Pérez, M. E. (2011). Ownership structure and board effectiveness as determinants of TMT compensation in Spanish listed firms. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 12(1), 92-109. https://doi.org/10.3846/161 11699.2011.555371
  • Sánchez Marín, G., Lozano Reina, G., Baixauli Soler, J. S. y Lucas Pérez, M. E. (2017). Say on pay effectiveness, corporate governance mechanisms, and CEO compensation alignment. BRQ Business Research Quarterly, 20(4), 226-239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq. 2017.07.001
  • Sánchez Marín, G., Lucas Pérez, M. E., Baixauli Soler, J. S., Main, B. y Mínguez Vera, A. (2022). Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis. Managerial and Decision Economics (in press). https:// doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3564
  • Stathopoulos, K. y Voulgaris, G. (2016). The importance of shareholder activism: The case of say-on-pay. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 359-370. https:// doi.org/10.1111/corg.12147
  • Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D. y Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196-220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467- 6486.2007.00752.x
  • Zajac, E. J. y Westphal, J. D. (1995). Accounting for the explanations of CEO compensation: Substance and symbolism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(2), 283-308. https:// doi.org/10.2307/2393639
La source de données: Dialnet