Can salaries and re-election prevent political corruption?an empirical evidence

  1. Bernardino Benito 1
  2. María-Dolores Guillamón 1
  3. Ana-María Ríos 2
  4. Bastida Albaladejo, Francisco José 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia
    info

    Universidad de Murcia

    Murcia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03p3aeb86

  2. 2 Department of Economics and Juridical Sciences, University Centre of Defence at the Spanish Air Force Academy, MDE-UPCT, Santiago de la Ribera, Murcia, Spain
Revista:
Revista de contabilidad = Spanish accounting review: [RC-SAR]

ISSN: 1138-4891

Año de publicación: 2018

Volumen: 21

Número: 1

Páginas: 19-27

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.RCSAR.2017.04.003 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Revista de contabilidad = Spanish accounting review: [RC-SAR]

Resumen

Antecedentes y objetivos: Este artículo se centra principalmente en las decisiones que adoptan los políticos y que pueden afectar al nivel de corrupción municipal. Específicamente, se analiza si los impulsos que mueven a los políticos locales a corromperse están influidos por los salarios que reciben y/o su intención de presentarse a las próximas elecciones. Esta cuestión apenas se ha abordado empíricamente antes a nivel local.Método y datos: Nuestra muestra comprende 358 municipios españoles de más de 20.000 habitantes durante el período 2004-2009. Utilizamos dos métodos diferentes de estimación: los mínimos cuadrados ordinarios y el modelo logit ordenado, para analizar la influencia en la corrupción de los salarios de los políticos y/o su intención de presentarse a la reelección. Utilizamos como medida de corrupción el total de casos de corrupción urbana (comunicados en la prensa en línea) en cada municipio durante este período.Resultados: Se muestra que existe repercusión de los salarios y la reelección en la corrupción. En primer lugar, los salarios relativamente más altos no reducen los impulsos de los políticos a corromperse. En segundo lugar, cuando los políticos quieren ser reelegidos, la corrupción disminuye. También encontramos que el nivel de ingresos, la desigualdad en los ingresos, el nivel de educación, los ingresos urbanos municipales y la naturaleza turística del municipio afectan a la corrupción.

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