Coordination structures

  1. Alfonso Rosa García 1
  2. Hubert Janos Kiss 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia
    info

    Universidad de Murcia

    Murcia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03p3aeb86

  2. 2 Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, España
Revista:
Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD

Any de publicació: 2012

Número: 12

Pàgines: 1-49

Tipus: Document de treball

Resum

We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in an observation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find that coordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence is necessary and sufficient when agents are homogenous and sufficient when agents differ and their types are private. Other structures guarantee coordination when agents decide in some particular sequences or for particular payoffs. The coordination problem embodied in our game is applied to the problems of revolts and bank runs.