Asignación de surtido, mercado paralelo y enforcement en la cadena de suministro de artículos de gran consumoUn análisis empírico

  1. Fernando Gimeno-Arias 1
  2. Miguel Hernández-Espallardo 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia
    info

    Universidad de Murcia

    Murcia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03p3aeb86

Revista:
Dirección y organización: Revista de dirección, organización y administración de empresas

ISSN: 1132-175X

Año de publicación: 2020

Número: 72

Páginas: 52-66

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.37610/DYO.V0I72.586 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Dirección y organización: Revista de dirección, organización y administración de empresas

Resumen

El propósito del artículo es el análisis de la estrategia dentro de la cadena de suministro de artículos de gran consumo. El diseño del canal de distribución es una situación crítica donde se confronta la estrategia con el comportamiento de los agentes. Se observa que la alternativa del distribuidor en caso de disconformidad con el surtido asignado es el recurso al mercado paralelo. El análisis conduce al estudio del efecto de la disciplina del fabricante sobre el canal para hacer cumplir la estrategia de distribución oficial. Las conclusiones son expuestas a partir de resultados obtenidos en un análisis empírico.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • 1. Aiken, L.S. and West, S.G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
  • 2. Akerlof, R. (2016). Anger and enforcement. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 126, 110-124.
  • 3. Anderson, J.C. and Gerbing, D.W. (1988). Structural equation modeling in practice: A review and recommended two-step approach. Psychological Bulletin, 103 (3), 411-423.
  • 4. Antia, K.D., Bergen, M.E. and Dutta, S. (2004). Competing with gray markets. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46 (1), 62-71.
  • 5. Antia, K.D., Bergen, M.E., Dutta, S. and Fisher, R.J. (2006). How does enforcement deter gray market incidence? Journal of Marketing, 70 (January), 92-106.
  • 6. Antia, K.D. and Frazier, G.L. (2001). The severity of contract enforcement in interfirm channel relationships. Journal of Marketing, 65 (October), 67-81.
  • 7. Armstron, J.S. and Overton, T.S. (1977). Estimating nonresponse bias in mail Surveys. Journal of Marketing Research, 14 (3), 396-402.
  • 8. Assmus, G. and Wiese, C. (1995). How to address the gray market threat using price coordination. Sloan Management Review, 36 (3, Spring), 31-41.
  • 9. Bagozzi, R.P. and Yi, Y. (1988). On the evaluation of structural equation models. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16 (1), 74-94.
  • 10. Bandyopadhyay, S. (2010). The internet and gray marketing. The International Business & Economics Research Journal, 9 (6), 95-101.
  • 11. Bergen, M.E., Heide, J.B. and Dutta, S. (1998). Managing gray markets through tolerance of violations: A transaction cost perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics, 19 (3), 157-165.
  • 12. Bergkvist, L. and Rossiter, J.R. (2007). The predictive validity of multiple-item versus single-item measures of the same constructs. Journal of Marketing Research, 44 (2), 175-184.
  • 13. Berman, B. (2004). Strategies to combat the sale of gray market goods. Business Horizons, 47 (4), 51-60.
  • 14. Cao, Q. and Zhang J. (2019). Gray market’s product quality in the circular economy era. International Journal of Production Research, Vol. 58 (1), 338-331.
  • 15. Cespedes, F.V., Corey, E.R. and Rangan, V.K. (1988). Gray markets: Causes and cures. Harvard Business Review, July-August, 75-82.
  • 16. Corey, E.R., Cespedes, F.V. and Rangan, V.K. (1989). Going to market: Distribution systems for industrial products. Harvard Business School, First edition.
  • 17. Coughlan, A.T., Anderson, E., Stern, L.W. and El- Ansary, A.I. (2006). Marketing channels. Prentice Hall, Seventh edition.
  • 18. Dutta, S., Bergen, M. and John, G. (1994). The governance of exclusive territories when dealers can bootleg. Marketing Science, 13 (1), 83-99.
  • 19. Dutta, S., Heide, J.B. and Bergen, M. (1999). Vertical territory restrictions and public policy: Theories and industry evidence. Journal of Marketing, 63 (October), 121-134.
  • 20. Frazier, G.L. (1999). Organizing and managing channels of distribution. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 27 (2), 226-240.
  • 21. Gerbing, D.W. and Anderson, J.C. (1988). An updated paradigm for scale development incorporating unidimensionality and its assessment. Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (2), 186-192.
  • 22. Gilliland, D.I., Bello, D.C. and Gundlach, G.T. (2010). Control-based channel governance and relative dependence. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38 (4), 441-455.
  • 23. Gray, L.N., Alfred C. M., David A.W. and Menke, B. (1982). A game theoretical analysis of the components of punishments. Social Psychology Quarterly, 45 (4), 206-212.
  • 24. Gudigantala, N. and Bicen, P. (2019). Do consumers’ ethical judgments matter for purchase intentions in online gray markets?. Journal of Marketing Development and Competitivenes, Vol. 13 (4), 27-43.
  • 25. Gundlach, G.T. (2013). Evolving changes in consumer shopping, marketing distribution and competitive interaction. The Antitrust Bulletin, 58 (1), 1-18.
  • 26. Hair, J.F. Jr., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L. and Black, W.C. (1999). Análisis multivariante. Prentice Hall, 5ª edición.
  • 27. Heide, J.B. (1994). Interorganizational governance in marketing channels. Journal of Marketing, 58 (January), 71-85.
  • 28. Heide, J.B., Dutta, S. and Bergen, M. (1998). Exclusive dealing and business efficiency: Evidence from industry practice. Journal of Law and Economics, 41 (2), 387- 408.
  • 29. Henstridge, J., Homel, R. and Mackay, P.M. (1997). The long-term of random breath testing in four Australian States: A time series analysis. Australian Government: Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
  • 30. Jaccard, J.J., Turrisi, R. and Wan, C.K. (1990). Interaction effects in multiple regression. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA.
  • 31. John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some antecedents of opportunism in a marketing channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 21 (3), 278-289.
  • 32. Kumar, A., Heide, J.B., and Wathne, K.H. (2011). Performance implications of mismatched governance regimes across external and internal relationships, Journal of Marketing, 75 (March), 1-17.
  • 33. Mukhtar, M.A., Cecil, H.W. and Knoblett, J.A. (2001). The effects of tax rates and enforcement policies on taxpayer compliance: A study of self-employed taxpayers. Atlantic Economic Journal, 29 (2), 186-202.
  • 34. Myers, M.B. (1999). Incidents of gray market activity among U.S. exporters: Occurrences, characteristics, and consequences. Journal of International Business Studies, 30 (1), 105-126.
  • 35. Nunnlee, M.P. (2005). The control of intra-channel opportunism through the use of inter-channel communication. Industrial Marketing Management, 34, 515-525.
  • 36. Rindfleisch, A. (2019). Transaction cost theory: Past, present and future. Academy of Marketing Science Review, 1-13.
  • 37. Rossiter, J.R. (2002). The C-OAR-SE procedure for scale development in marketing. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 19, 305-335.
  • 38. Sa Vinhas, A. and Heide, J.B. (2014). Forms of competition and outcomes in dual distribution channels: The distributor’s perspective. Marketing Science, 34 (1), 1-16.
  • 39. Shaffer, S. (1990). Regulatory compliance with nonlinear penalties, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2 (1), 99-103.
  • 40. Wathne, K.H. and Heide, J.B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: Forms, outcomes, and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64 (October), 36-51.
  • 41. Zhao, K., Zhao, X. and Deng, J. (2016). An empirical investigation of online gray markets. Journal of Retailing, 92 (4), 397-410.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet