Net operating working capital and firm valueA cross-country analysis

  1. Sonia Baños-Caballero 1
  2. Pedro J García-Teruel 1
  3. Pedro Martínez-Solano 1
  1. 1 University of Murcia,Spain.
Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444,  2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2020

Volumen: 23

Número: 3

Páginas: 234-251

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1177/2340944420941464 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

Aquí, utilizamos una muestra de empresas de 30 países durante el período 1995-2013 para examinar la relación entre el capital de trabajo operativo neto (NWC) y el valor de la empresa. Específicamente, mostramos que el valor de NWC varía entre países y que depende tanto de la protección del inversor como del desarrollo económico y financiero de un país. Nuestros hallazgos implican que los accionistas valoran más a NWC en países con un fuerte cumplimiento de los derechos de los inversores y un mayor desarrollo financiero y económico.

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Información de financiación

This research is part of project ECO2016-76481-P (AEI/ FEDER, UE) financed by the Research Agency of the Spanish government and the European Regional Development Fund. The authors also acknowledge financial support from Fundaciόn CajaMurcia.

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