Voting behavior and budget stability

  1. Vicente Oliva, Cristina
  2. Ríos Martínez, Ana María
  3. Guillamón López, María Dolores
Revista:
Revista de contabilidad = Spanish accounting review: [RC-SAR]

ISSN: 1138-4891

Año de publicación: 2013

Volumen: 16

Número: 1

Páginas: 46-52

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/S1138-4891(13)70005-0 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDIGITUM editor

Otras publicaciones en: Revista de contabilidad = Spanish accounting review: [RC-SAR]

Información de financiación

We acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2010-17463 and ECO2010-20522).

Financiadores

    • ECO2010-20522

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