Interpretación radical y escepticismo.

Abstract

This work examines whether it follows a refutation of scepticism from Donald Davidsons work on radical interpretation. It is argued that such a conclusion does not follow from Donald Davidsons views on thought and language, not even with the help of the so called omniscient interpreter argument. This work also rejects that such views on language and thought lead to a better result against scepticism when interpreted as a modest transcendental argument. Finally it is claimed that the best way of articulating Davidsons antisceptical strategy is as a theoretical diagnosis of scepticism in a similar vein as Michael Williams has developed in his book Unnatural Doubts. From this point of view what Davidsons philosophy would do is, on the one hand, to reproach the sceptic his adherence to representationism and, on the other hand, to defend an alternative to this philosophical view that explains how thought and language are possible. Conceived of in this way, Davidsons philosophy would not constitute a definitive victory against scepticism. However it would show that scepticism is not compulsory and, at the very least, it would guarantee a presumption of innocence for our beliefs when they face the sceptical threat.