Basar una creencia en una razón

  1. Gascón Salvador, José Ángel 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia
    info

    Universidad de Murcia

    Murcia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03p3aeb86

Zeitschrift:
Revista iberoamericana de argumentación

ISSN: 2172-8801

Datum der Publikation: 2021

Nummer: 23

Seiten: 84-97

Art: Artikel

DOI: 10.15366/RIA2021.23.005 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Andere Publikationen in: Revista iberoamericana de argumentación

Zusammenfassung

When an epistemic subject is justified in believing something, she bases that belief on a reason. Thus, a basing relation is created. But what does that relation consist in? According to causal theories, the reason causes the belief; whereas, according to doxastic theories, the subject forms a metabelief about the basing relation. Causal theories face serious difficulties from the perspectives of argumentation theory and the psychology of reasoning. At the same time, doxastic theories overintellectualise the basing relation. Finally, an adaptation of doxastic theories will be suggested here, based on the idea of treating a belief as a reason in an argumentative sense.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet