La integridad de los gobernantes como problema de acción colectiva

Abstract

In societies where the perception of corruption is very high, it is hard to encourage the integrity of rulers. In these settings, to gain a privileged access to the ruler is the most valuable goal for advancing my own interests. Thus, the way to protect my individual interests g oes against the collective aim of having a government that deals with citizens in a fair and impartial way. For this reason, political representation in based on clientelistic exchanges in these societies: political support in the form of votes or campaign financing or media support, etc. in exchange for gaining privileged access to public resources in the form of public employment, contracts, subsidies, favorable regulations, etc. That is, political support is built on the basis of ensuring a direct and pe rsonalized way to public authorities and not on the basis of an equitable application of universal rules. Furthermore, in order for politicians to be able to distribute public resources in a particularistic way and to leave general rules unenforced whereve r they need it, it is necessary to deactivate the checks and balances that constrain executive power. This text draws practical lessons for the effectiveness of the fight against corruption in this type of social settings.