El control social como elemento imprescindible para el éxito de la lucha contra la corrupciónalgunas reflexiones a partir del caso español

  1. Fernando Jiménez Sánchez 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia, España
Journal:
Praxis sociológica

ISSN: 1575-0817

Year of publication: 2016

Issue: 21

Pages: 121-140

Type: Article

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Abstract

This article reviews the key aspects leading to the frequent failure of anticorruption reforms and highlights the essential role of social accountability for its success. Special attention is paid to the Spanish social transformation since the beginning of the economic crisis of 2008.

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