Retribución de los altos directivos y gobierno corporativo en las empresas cotizadas españolas

  1. Sánchez Marín, Gregorio
  2. Baixauli Soler, Juan Samuel
  3. Lucas Pérez, María Encarnación
Revista:
Universia Business Review

ISSN: 1698-5117

Año de publicación: 2013

Número: 37

Páginas: 16-31

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Universia Business Review

Resumen

This paper examines the whole role of both board of directors and ownership structure on the effectiveness of executive compensation design in Spanish listed firms. Using a principalprincipal agency framework and based on panel data methodology analysis in the period 2004-2011, results show that high level of ownership concentration influence negatively in the executive compensation alignment, having an adverse effect on minority shareholders� interests. Moreover, evidences show that type of controlling shareholder determines supervisory board effectiveness, which only exert an effective monitoring over executive compensation � increasing variable pay and diminishing fixed salary-, when majority shareholder has not linked to management of the company.

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